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“No useless Mouth”: Iroquoian Food Diplomacy in the American Revolution 
 
After 1660, writes historian Michael LaCombe, Englishmen depicted Native Americans 
as “tragic, hungry, and helpless victims.”1 A century later, Anglo-Irishman William Johnson, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, did otherwise. In describing the increased expense of Indian 
alliances in 1765 he complained, “All the Bull feasts ever given at Albany would not now draw 
down Ten Indians.”2 LaCombe’s English writers portrayed powerless, starving Indians, while 
Johnson worried about powerful ones uninterested in feasting. Historians must reconcile these 
contrasting portrayals. This article examines several ideas about Native hunger—that of the 
starving, useless mouth, that of the supplicant using hunger as a metaphor, and that of the warrior 
capable of doing without European provisions—which emerged over more than a century of 
Native and non-Native diplomacy. It contends that British misunderstandings of Iroquois 
(otherwise known as Six Nations, or Haudenosaunee) hunger during the American Revolution 
enabled Indians to use food diplomacy to retain power during a period that historians have 
characterized as disastrous for Natives.3 Indians accepted provisions and then refused to do what 
their allies wished, they explicitly ignored their hunger, and most significantly, they destroyed 
their allies’ food.  
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 Michael A. LaCombe, Political Gastronomy: Food and Authority in the English Atlantic World (Philadelphia, PA, 
2012), 169.  
2
 William Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, Johnson Hall, May 29, 1765, in The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol. 
4, ed. Alexander C. Flick (Albany, NY, 1925), 748 (hereafter PSWJ). 
3
 Although Haudenosaunee peoples today call themselves by this term, I use “Iroquois” and “Six Nations” 
interchangeably as the most commonly utilized titles of the time. 
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Food diplomacy—the distribution of or abstention from grain, meat, and alcohol to forge 
or maintain connections—was not unique to the Revolution. Scholars employ various terms to 
describe it: “food diplomacy,” “food aid,” “culinary diplomacy,” “political gastronomy,” and 
“gastrodiplomacy.”4 As food writer Mark Bittman observes about the term “foodie,” “proposing 
new words” can be “a fool’s game,” but the need to make extant phrases “more meaningful” 
remains because hunger has changed over time.5 “Food diplomacy” is an umbrella term that best 
fits the American Revolution. Food aid is distributed to ordinary people in reaction to a crisis. 
Gastrodiplomacy conjures images of statesmen negotiating over grand meals. Gastronomy is 
about “delicate eating,” while the word “culinary” invokes kitchens.6 Food diplomacy 
encompasses the reactive nature of food aid as well as preemptive distributions. It includes the 
alliance-making of government officials and maneuvering of traders and ordinary soldiers. 
Finally, the term emphasizes the non-gastronomic nature of eighteenth-century salt pork and 
boiled beef.  
One might question whether Iroquois actions qualify as food diplomacy if Indian 
intentions are unclear; drawing on the idea of unintended consequences I contend that they 
count. Colonial documents produced by non-Natives recorded what Indians did—or rather, what 
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Europeans said they did—with varying biases, but they rarely said what Indians thought.7 Native 
American history describes Europeans unknowingly participating in Indian protocols; John 
Smith brokering an alliance with Powhatans during an adoption ceremony that he understood as 
a cancelled execution is just one example.8 Scholarship on security governance—a new type of 
policy that differs from conventional national and international approaches in its focus on 
multiple groups and individuals (as well as states), and its preference for horizontal rather than 
top-down policy-making and informal rather than formal governance structures—has explored 
the idea of unintended consequences. My analysis of food diplomacy draws on this idea of 
unintended consequences because the concept helpfully suggests the “fuzziness” of proving 
intention.9 Iroquois Indians managed to change British perceptions of Indian hunger; their 
actions were diplomatic, regardless of their intentions. 
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Historians have interpreted the American Revolution as a disaster for Indians.10 Barbara 
Graymont and Colin Calloway both refer to the “shattered” Iroquois Confederacy.11 Calloway 
has argued that during the Revolution starving Six Nations “became increasingly dependent” on 
British allies after 1779.12 Alan Taylor has described how “the hungry year” of 1789 prompted 
Indian compromises with the United States in exchange for food aid.13 Work on other time 
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periods has uncovered moments of Iroquois resilience.14 José Brandão and W. A. Starna state 
that the Iroquois, while embroiled in wars that placed them on either side of a conflict, 
established a policy of neutrality from 1701 onward, which allowed them to play the French and 
English against each other while maintaining a policy of nonaggression toward other Iroquois.15 
Gilles Havard, taking a less optimistic but still positive approach, suggests that the 1701 treaties 
with the English at Albany and French at Montreal represented a “reorientation” of Iroquois 
diplomacy.16 Jon Parmenter argues that between 1676 and 1760 the Iroquois limited Iroquois-on-
Iroquois violence, refusing to fight against their brethren when France and England warred.17 In 
contrast to this optimistic turn in scholarship that focuses on other periods of Iroquois history, 
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most current work on the Revolution, in its focus on Indian land losses, continues to portray 
Iroquois experiences negatively.18  
Scholarship on food, war, and hunger has resulted in various conclusions about power. 
Richard White’s seminal concept of the “middle ground,” or the process of creating mutually 
recognizable practices that were creatively misunderstood, has been used by Michael LaCombe 
to describe misunderstandings over foodstuffs that deteriorated into hunger and violence by 
1660. Wayne Lee and John Grenier have observed that although by the seventeenth century 
deliberate starvation of noncombatants became uncommon in Western Europe, Europeans 
targeted Native American crops throughout the eighteenth century. Work by James Vernon 
suggests that people remained powerless to prevent hunger until the nineteenth century.19 
Though historians should not overlook Iroquois deaths from starvation, it is necessary to 
reexamine their hunger after the destruction of their food caches in 1779.20  
A closer look at perceptions of Iroquois hunger after 1779 suggests Indians’ continuing 
independence, and continuity as well as change. People had destroyed enemy foodstuffs since 
the colonial period, but they rarely targeted crops of military allies. War had always been a time 
for people to share the experience of hunger, but it is unusual for food diplomacy to include this 
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understanding of deprivation. Non-Native misunderstandings of Indian hunger were crucial to 
British Indian policy, Iroquois reactions to it (epitomized by their food destruction), and the 
articulation of U.S. Indian policy after the Revolution. Food diplomacy allowed for creative 
changes in Indians’ interactions with Anglo-American officials. Natives used food to fight back. 
They were not passive receivers of food; they demanded it, supplied it, and destroyed it. 
*** 
 
It is difficult to estimate Native population because officials sometimes omitted women 
and children in surveys, but by the 1760s between 6,400 and 10,000 Iroquois lived south of Lake 
 
Figure 1. Guy Johnson, Map of the Six Nations, 1771, The Documentary History of the State of New-York, ed. E. B. 
O'Callaghan (Albany, NY, 1851), vol. 4, 1090. Courtesy of the Institute of Historical Research, London. The Mohawks and 
Tuscaroras are not pictured; the Tuscaroras lived between and below the Onondagas and Oneidas, and the Mohawks east of 
the Oneidas. 
8 
Ontario.21 The Mohawks occupied Canajoharie and Tiononderoge in the Mohawk Valley, and 
the Oneidas and Tuscaroras shared the Susquehanna Valley region and the area around Oneida 
Lake. The Cayugas and Onondagas dwelled west by the Finger Lakes, while the Senecas, the 
most numerous, inhabited the Genesee and Allegheny River valleys and the Seneca and 
Canandaigua lakes.22 
By this time Europeans and Iroquois observed several overlapping practices driven by the 
ideas of Gayaneshagowa, on which the Iroquois League was founded, and by Guswenta, which 
emerged after contact with Europeans. It is unclear when the League was founded (sometime 
before European conquest), whether it initially promoted war or defense, or whether early 
Iroquois distinguished between the League and Iroquois Confederacy. By the eighteenth century 
most people referred to the Iroquois Confederacy. 23 Deganawidah, the Iroquois prophet whose 
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history is chronicled in several conflicting myths, created the Iroquois League on six principles 
expressed in three terms: peace, righteousness, and civil authority. Together, these comprise 
Gayaneshagowa, or the Great Law of Peace.24 Gayaneshagowa provided the framework for the 
policies of nonaggression and neutrality, forest diplomacy, and mourning rituals that shaped 
everyday life. Gayaneshagowa allowed Indians to present a neutral face to the French and 
English while cultivating non-Native relationships, serving on military campaigns in ways that 
advanced Indian interests, limiting Iroquois deaths, and replacing dead kin with captives. Even 
when allied to competing European empires, Iroquois warriors agreed to “an ethic of mutual 
nonaggression” against other Iroquois.25  
Guswenta became an extension of Gayaneshagowa that applied to Europeans with whom 
the Iroquois wished to deal.26 Guswenta acknowledged that Natives and non-Natives could 
maintain friendship and peace by not interfering in each other’s government, religion, or lives.27 
It enabled Iroquois and Europeans to create recognizable but differently interpreted practices—
mourning ceremonies, treaty protocols including the smoking of peace pipes, the exchange of 
wampum, the use of metaphors, and the dispensation of alcohol, trade goods, and food goods—
through forest and trade diplomacy. This process, which Richard White has called “the middle 
ground,” occurred when a power balance existed.28 The majority of European-Iroquois 
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negotiations adhered to forest diplomacy, which established Iroquois forms to which all parties 
adhered.29 When Europeans met Indians they began with the condolence, or mourning ceremony, 
the metaphorical brightening of the chain of friendship, and a rehashing of past agreements. Only 
then did participants begin new business.30 William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
made extensive preparations for each meeting, which lasted weeks, cost thousands of pounds, 
and demanded his concentration: “I have scarcely a Moment to myself,” he complained, during 
negotiations with the Iroquois at the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix.31 Although non-Natives 
expressed frustration at forest diplomacy’s slow pace, they practiced it anyway.32  
 Once the mourning ceremony was completed and older agreements verified, officials 
and Iroquois could discuss new issues. In addition to meeting privately, people gave public 
speeches accompanied by wampum strings made from seashells, using larger belts for important 
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points.33 Metaphors made speeches even more effective.34 “We are all unanimously determined 
forever hereafter to hold fast the Covenant Chain, & live in peace & friendship with the 
English,” said wampum-holding Cayugas at a 1770 meeting.35 During previous centuries the 
Iroquois described their socio-political bonds with the Dutch as an iron chain, which became a 
silver chain known as the Covenant Chain in their dealings with the British.36 Regular exchanges 
of trade goods “polished” the Covenant Chain; they maintained alliances—but only because 
those goods were dispensed at meetings that also symbolically covered graves and unfolded at 
the pace that the Iroquois expected. 
Trade diplomacy—transferring material goods from Europeans to Indians to cultivate and 
maintain alliances—also operated according to Indian customs. It allowed power to flow through 
the goods bestowed, but more importantly through the kin networks and personal relationships 
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gift exchange created.37 At the same time, however, trade goods created confusion because they 
could function in a gift-exchange economy or a commodity-exchange economy, which at times 
blurred together.38 In a gift-exchange economy participants are repeatedly allied, interdependent, 
and of similar rank. Gifts are passed down, and participants cannot reject a gift. Although 
something is expected in return, the exchange symbolizes “something for nothing.” In a 
commodity-exchange economy people are temporarily allied, independent, and of different rank. 
Goods are individually owned and kept. The giving of goods precedes the acquisition of material 
wealth: it is a “something-for-something” trade.39 Indians participated in a commodity-exchange 
economy by exchanging their furs for cash or trade goods. The Dutch took part in a gift-
exchange economy by grudgingly giving trade goods as material necessities to maintain 
commerce; the French did so generously because their regulated fur trade meant Indians received 
lower prices for their furs, and needed encouragement to sell to them.40 The English gave gifts to 
compete with the French. In 1755, one man wrote to William Johnson and said that because “the 
frenchman had given a great gift to the Indians,” he found himself “ashamed” and asked Johnson 
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for “somewhat more presents.”41 The overlap between these two economies permitted the 
creative misunderstandings of the middle ground.  
 Food practices were part of this middle ground, but discussions of hunger must be read 
skeptically. Indians told Europeans they were hungry even when they were not because guests 
were supposed to exaggerate need so that hosts did not feel or appear proud.42 Although Seth 
Mallios, citing Marcel Mauss, suggests that food created a particularly important intercultural 
link in the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century Britons conflated trade and food goods.43 
When Mohawks “complained much of the want of provisions” Johnson recorded providing them 
with powder, not foodstuffs.44 Another observer assumed that Onondagas viewed “Rum, pipes 
and Tobacco as provisions and must have them also.”45 British records of Indian presents 
included food—pork and flour, corn and peas, rice and biscake, rum, Madeira, sugar, tea, butter, 
cattle, hams, and sheep—but they also included inedible blankets, gartering, knives, thread, and 
needles.46 Britons may have used the word “presents” rather than payment to avoid having to pay 
Indians regularly.  
Analyzing food goods and gifts is also difficult because it is hard to say which items were 
prestige items. Corn was central to Iroquois diets and symbolic practices, but sometimes Indians 
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valued commodities they could not produce themselves—such as alcohol. Alcohol has an 
extensive, separate historiography; it destroyed Indian communities, but also fit into Indian 
practices, such as dreaming.47 Other prestige foods included the dog meat consumed in 
ceremonial feasts, and the flesh of Iroquois enemies.48 Game animals conferred prestige, but so 
too did the nuts and berries women gathered.49 Attitudes toward domesticated animals, and thus 
toward beef, pork, and mutton, varied. By the mid-eighteenth century, some Oneidas and 
Mohawks began raising cattle.50 To a smaller extent Senecas also raised cattle, chickens, hogs, 
and horses.51 Non-Native attempts to change Indian husbandry yielded mixed reactions.52 
Indians conceived of animals differently. Sometimes animals preceded colonists’ imperial 
expansion (so Indians maimed them), sometimes they were status symbols for Indians interested 
in new forms of property (so they accumulated them for redistribution), and only sometimes 
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were they meat—and even then the animals went unfenced.53 Although there is not much 
evidence that eighteenth-century Iroquois raised cattle to produce leather, it is clear that some 
Indians raised domesticated animals without intending to eat them.   
In colonial America food diplomacy remained part of other practices. Food was 
connected to neutrality because of how Europeans competed for Iroquois allegiance. The English 
obsessed over what the French offered Indian allies. In 1757 a captured marine revealed that the 
French provided “as much feasting as the Indians please at going out, & on their Return” guns, 
clothing, and “as much provisions as they please, or can Eat.” This generosity was significant 
because according to the Frenchman, their provisions were “Scarce in general,” bordering on the 
“very Scarce.”54 When the French possessed “neither Provisions nor presents” the English had an 
easier time convincing the Indians to ally with them.55 French abilities to provide for Native 
allies even when they themselves went hungry was essential to colonial food diplomacy.  
Six Nations, in addition to accepting European provisions, stored food as a precaution 
against total war, which allowed them to maintain their stance of nonaggression toward other 
Iroquois.56 Indians grew maize, beans, and squash on commonly-owned land—individuals 
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claimed ownership of crops, but the land itself belonged to matrilineal clans. Women produced 
most foodstuffs. Some Iroquois settlement—especially among Senecas—was dispersed, creating 
multiple “edge areas” that fostered healthy habitats for deer and turkeys, and growing conditions 
for berries.57 During times of famine Indians consumed bark from elm and basswood trees, birds, 
boiled bones, dogs, eels, mussels, muskrats, and rotten meat.58 After Jacques-Reneé de Brisay, 
Marquis de Denonville’s 1687 attack against the Iroquois, in which the French burned Seneca 
villages and claimed to have destroyed 1,200,000 bushels of stored and standing corn, the 
Senecas dispersed. Warriors moved into the woods while sending the “homeless and starving” to 
protected Indian villages: Mohawks went to live with Oneidas, and Senecas with Cayugas and 
Onondagas. Scholar William Fenton suggested that this decision meant that “everyone shared the 
hardships,” but this sharing took place among Indians and not Europeans.59  
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Indians remained self-sufficient during eighteenth-century times of scarcity. During 
famine in 1741-42 Senecas skipped European meetings at Montreal and Pennsylvania, where 
food supplies would have been plentiful.60 In 1758 an Oneida explained that even though French 
soldiers experienced “Greatt want of provisions,” Indian women and children were eating stored 
corn, which male warriors would carry on war expeditions.61 “Women of the Six Nations . . . 
provide our Warriors with Provisions when they go abroad,” even when warriors fought 
alongside Europeans, explained the Iroquois.62 When Europeans gave rations to warriors, it was 
not because Indians needed them. 
Eighteenth-century food diplomacy’s connection to forest and trade diplomacy was 
evident in distributions of edible goods to visitors, treaty participants, and needy villagers. Food 
proved essential before, during, and after meetings. Indians expected food and alcohol, which 
they referred to as “kettles” and “staffs” respectively, along the route to a treaty.63 As soon as a 
meeting was scheduled, Johnson received inquiries about “the Quantity of Provisions [he] would 
require.”64 After the greeting ceremonies and condolence speeches, treaty attendees consumed a 
“nourishing meal” and went to bed, rather than beginning discussions. Sometime Indians 
provided important Anglo-American newcomers with Indian names, expecting reciprocity in a 
donation of alcohol, provisions, and tobacco.65 Food consumption helped slow the pace to a 
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speed that Indians approved. After meetings Iroquois expected food for the homeward journey, 
along with generous dispensations of trade goods.66 After meeting Tuscaroras in September 
1767, for instance, Johnson gave them some money and “Provisions to carry them home.”67  
In the 1750s Johnson provisioned people before, during, and after treaties, and also gave 
food to visitors at his New York home (Johnson Hall), to warriors for military expeditions, and 
to villages in need of corn when war disrupted hunting and planting.68 These distributions 
dovetailed with Indians’ “one dish and one spoon” (sometimes, “eating out of one dish,” or “the 
same dish”) metaphor, which changed over time. Before 1701, the phrase signified war: enemies 
boiled each other in kettles. Afterward, the metaphor shifted to a peacetime one of eating 
together during joint hunts and war and became a symbolic way to describe commonly-held 
hunting territory. When the common dish was empty, everyone went hungry. The one dish 
became an objective of peace as well as a foundation of it.69 As part of forest diplomacy this 
trope made its way into the speeches Europeans made as well as into the actions they took to 
cultivate alliances.  
Food goods, like trade goods, were sometimes part of a gift-exchange economy, and at 
other times part of a commodity-exchange economy. On the commodity-exchange front, 
Onondagas in the 1750s received provisions for providing Johnson with intelligence about the 
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French. Spies received provisions, powder, and shot for their services.70 Johnson gave Mohawks 
“cash for a feast” because those Indians were “going to War” against the French.71 For the most 
part the English treated food as part of a gift-exchange commodity by abiding by Indian notions 
of distribution. “Indians will not be content” with provisions “according to any certain allowance 
but will require it as often as hungry,” wrote Johnson in 1764.72 The state of British supplies had 
to be of secondary importance. In March 1760 although Johnson worried about his dwindling 
stores, he fed Indians anyway and wrote to Jeffery Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Army in North America, requesting more provisions.73 That winter Mohawks had been 
“supplyed with Provisions from Fort Herkheimer,” and Oneidas “fed the whole Winter at Fort 
Stanwix.”74 Indians were not to be denied food. 
Pre-Revolutionary food diplomacy, bound up in the policy of neutrality and in forest and 
trade diplomacy, reveals two kinds of Indians in the colonial records: hungry Indians and self-
sufficient ones. These conflicting ideas stretched back at least to descriptions of Indians in the 
1590s.75 Self-sufficient mid-eighteenth-century Iroquois provisioned warriors and women with 
their own stored corn. Hungry Indians accepted food aid from Britons, but in keeping with their 
own diplomacy required it in unfixed quantities. Rather than offering a definitive assessment of 
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pre-Revolutionary Indian eating habits, it is more productive to conclude that these ideas suggest 
two strands of European perceptions. On the one hand, British officials including Johnson feared 
Indians’ enormous appetites. In 1765 he could complain that all the previous decades’ feasts at 
Albany would be insufficient to convince the Iroquois to fight for the British.76 On the other 
hand, Britons found Indians not as hungry as they seemed. Thus in 1758 when Oneidas and 
Tuscaroras came to see Johnson “in a Starving Condition” because their crops had failed, 
Johnson gave them cash to purchase provisions rather than feed them immediately.77 When he 
fed Mohawks in 1760 he justified the decision by citing the destruction of their corn, but he also 
critiqued their “Habit of Idleness,” which he said prevented farming.78  
By the 1760s a combination of competing empires, imperial agents fighting with 
politicians, and land hunger undermined forest and trade diplomacy and the Iroquois policy of 
neutrality, allowing food to rise in importance. The Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) and the 
conflict known as Pontiac’s War (1763-1766) changed Indian affairs because of declining French 
influence and shifting British policies regarding trade.79 By the Seven Years’ War’s end the 
British claimed land around the Great Lakes, the Ohio Valley, and present-day Canada. French 
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and British presents had ensured Iroquois neutrality.80 During the war British gifts increased in 
quantity and frequency while French officials’ inabilities to cooperate with each other, combined 
with austerity measures from Versailles, impeded French trade diplomacy.81 By 1757 most 
Natives refused to assist the French, and at the same time the French had become more cautious 
about employing them.82  
Changes in fur availability led to less effective British trade diplomacy. Scholars do not 
agree on which furs were in decline; some suggest that beaver, deer, and otter populations 
dropped as early as 1670.83 José Brandão and Gilles Havard concur that it is difficult to estimate 
seventeenth-century beaver numbers because of Indian tendencies to exaggerate their poverty.84 
Skins of smaller animals—“raccoons,” “otter[s],” “Musquashes” (muskrats), and “Cats”—do 
appear for sale in the Johnson papers, but Johnson also continued to record sales of beaver and 
deerskins.85 What is clear, even if precise numbers for animals remain elusive, is that the trade 
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changed, as did Indian hunting habits.86 Seneca hunting transitioned from beaver to white-tailed 
deer before 1750.87 In 1762 Mohawks further east reported that deer were scarce.88 Transforming 
access to deerskins disrupted gender divisions in Native communities, shifting power from the 
sachems in charge of hunting and the women who had once prepared skins to younger warriors.89 
The Iroquois overhunted, and Natives struggled to control the value of the furs they exchanged.90 
Strategically, Britons should have increased their gift-giving practices during this time period, in 
keeping with the tenets of the gift-exchange economy, but one system of exchange usually 
prevailed.91 
Mid-eighteenth-century diplomacy became difficult to practice because some English 
officials began to insist that trade and food goods constituted part of a commodity-exchange 
economy. Those who wished to continue distributions in keeping with a gift-exchange economy 
could not do so once goods became elusive. Johnson received complaints about the Indians who 
drew “from us their Constant Maintainance with Presents and arms, and amunition, without 
doing any Service for them.”92 In 1761 he described Indians’ grievances about “the dearness of 
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goods” and traders’ corruption.93 There are also indications that food diplomacy was in flux. In 
1762 Oneida speaker Conoghquieson complained, “if we were Starving with Hunger . . . they 
will not give Us a Morsel of Any thing; a Usage very different from What we had Reason to 
Expect.” This point was so important that he concluded with a long belt of wampum, rather than 
a smaller string.94 Something had to be done. With the approval of Jeffery Amherst, who was by 
then Governor-General of British North America, Johnson issued a number of reforms. Like the 
French before him, he limited commerce to British posts, appointed commissaries, and fixed fur 
prices from Pennsylvania to present-day Ohio.95 Word of his changes spread to Detroit, Niagara, 
and Oswego. To a point, the atmosphere improved.  
In the main, however, British trade good diplomacy deteriorated because Amherst not 
only approved Johnson’s trade regulations, but also cut distributions of gunpowder, and the 
practice of gift-giving and hosting Indians—thus provoking the conflict that came to be known 
as Pontiac’s War.96 In August 1761 Amherst wrote to Johnson and instructed him “to avoid all 
presents in future.”97 Although Johnson agreed with the idea of restricting gift-giving, he worried 
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about changes to Indian diplomacy. When he objected, Amherst overruled him.98 Historically, 
failure to reciprocate during an exchange usually led to violence.99 True to form, Delawares, 
Hurons, Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Miamis, Mingos, Ojibwas, Ottawas, Piankashaws, 
Potawatomis, Senecas, Shawnees, Weas, and Wyandots seized every British post west of the 
Appalachians, three forts excepted. War ended in 1764, when most Indians made peace.100  
Afterwards, the future of trade diplomacy was uncertain. On the one hand, signs appeared 
that the customs of trade diplomacy could recover. Officials in North America, led by Johnson, 
tried to enforce land boundaries, regulate trade, resolve disputes, and assign Indian agents who 
could speak on behalf of the British Empire.101 Johnson resumed gift distributions.102 By 1764 
the London Board of Trade accepted many of Johnson’s reforms, and imperial agents 
implemented them following Pontiac’s War.103 In the early 1770s, Amherst’s hated policies even 
drifted into disuse.104 On the other hand, concomitant events made the practice of trade 
diplomacy challenging. By 1768 Whitehall rejected Johnson’s recommendations for trade; debt 
from the Seven Years’ War made ministers cautious about allocating funds for Indian affairs. 
Johnson retained his position as Superintendent, and thus official management of Indian 
diplomacy, but the ministry allowed each individual colony to become responsible for regulating 
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trade.105 Colonial governors proved more interested in acquiring Indian land than in prosecuting 
land grabbers.106 At a council at Johnson Hall in July 1774, in the midst of trying to convince 
Iroquois leaders to limit violence against land-hungry colonists, William Johnson died. Although 
Guy Johnson, William Johnson’s cousin and son-in-law, smoothed things over by agreeing to 
take over Sir William’s job, Sir William’s diplomacy was irreplaceable.107  
Pre-Revolutionary food practices blended with forest diplomacy, trade diplomacy, 
neutrality, and Iroquois nonaggression, from the condolence ceremony to the distribution of trade 
goods to the gifting of symbolic consumable commodities. By the 1760s the idea of self-
sufficient Indians existed alongside the idea of dependent, hungry Indians. Food could be a 
special commodity, as evidenced by the huge quantities that officials distributed as part of forest 
diplomacy. Yet so too could officials claim that Indians did not depend on Europeans for food, 
and that for military expeditions especially, clan matrons remained responsible for growing and 
distributing the provisions that Indian warriors would consume while fighting with European 
allies.  
In the decade before the Revolution each of these diplomatic practices and policies were 
thrown into question by changing hunting practices, land battles, and conflicts over trade goods. 
Once the Revolution began, British ships sank or fell into the hands of the colonists, making 
importation of goods difficult. Americans, obviously, obtained fewer trade goods from Britain, 
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and the Continental Congress’s shortage of funds inhibited gift-giving.108 Historians 
acknowledge that diplomacy was in flux by the 1770s. They also argue that once hostilities 
commenced, Britons and Americans rushed to secure Indian allegiances.109 But because trade 
diplomacy was becoming less effective, they needed an additional way to do so. During the 
American Revolution the protocols of food diplomacy became crucial. 
*** 
Early in the war Americans and Britons practiced the food diplomacy that Natives and 
non-Natives created together during the colonial period by providing food aid to Indian villages 
and hosting meetings with mourning ceremonies, feasts, and provisions before and after. 
Iroquois supplied their own warriors with food, refused to attack other Iroquois while helping 
their allies to burn crops and steal animals, and ensured the food security of Native 
noncombatants. During the later war years American campaigns forced the Iroquois from their 
homes, resulting in increased Indian demands for food. Some British officials wished to 
accommodate these requests, while others proved unwilling to feed what they characterized as 
“useless mouths.” These conflicting policies, which stemmed from confusion over Indian 
hunger, allowed Indians to create a food diplomacy that deviated from its colonial counterpart. 
Although aspects remained the same, Iroquoian food diplomacy began to change after 1779 in 
two ways: Natives challenged British perceptions of Indian hunger by refusing to eat, and they 
deprived allied soldiers of food by destroying plundered foodstuffs. These practices resulted in 
the unintended consequence of pushing Britons to provision Indians more generously than ever 
before.  
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The British made the first move to partner with Indians. In 1774 they considered asking 
for Natives’ assistance; they implemented that strategy in 1777 under the direction of new 
imperial secretary of state Lord George Germain.110 In 1775 the American Continental Congress 
created the Southern, Middle, and Northern Departments, the last of which took charge of 
Iroquois liaisons.111 Most Oneida and half of the Tuscarora members sided with the Americans, 
and most Cayugas, Mohawks, Onondagas, and Senecas supported the British.  
Americans and Britons both struggled to obtain provisions. Disagreements between the 
Continental Army, state troops, and militia made it difficult for Americans to regulate supply and 
distribution.112 “Impassable” roads blocked provisions convoys.113 In 1778 storms destroyed 
Virginian mills, and the Hessian fly devoured Virginia and Maryland wheat before buzzing north 
to New York.114 Adulterated foodstuffs became common.115 During the Seven Years’ War the 
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British military had procured grain and animals from colonists, who now refused to supply their 
enemies.116 The British hesitated to plant crops near Indians’ towns for fear of violating the 1768 
Treaty of Stanwix.117 Northern food caches were “devoured by Caterpillars” in 1781.118 Whereas 
Americans complained of roads, British suppliers disagreed about the frequency and quantity of 
provisions to ship from England.119 Bread spoiled even when shipped through Cork, Ireland, 
arriving “bad, unfit for Use, mouldy & shipped in bags short of weight.”120  
Although General Burgoyne had curtailed his use of Indians on the battlefield after his 
defeat at Saratoga, the autumn of 1777 and spring of 1778 witnessed an increase in British-allied 
Iroquois raids and guerilla warfare.121 These Indians consumed poorer provisions compared to 
British troops. Letters from the likes of Major John Butler, who worked with the Six Nations, 
revealed that the Indians tasted “very little” fresh meat, except “the heads, Offals, & feet” of beef 
“too poor to be issued to the Garrison.” Fresh meat marked for the Indian Department went to the 
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garrison at Niagara instead.122 Mohawk Joseph Brant, who operated a group of Indians and 
Loyalists known as “Brant’s Volunteers,” had to scavenge at Niagara for rations for his unwaged 
warriors.123 This fact is not surprising given the extent to which soldiers disliked and distrusted 
Indians: Butlers’ men requested that the phrase “To Serve with the Indians” be struck from the 
terms of their commissions.124 Initially such inequalities did not cause problems because 
Gayaneshagowa privileged the preservation of Iroquois health and lives: Natives stored enough 
food in their villages to sustain other Indians, and clan matrons supplied warriors. 
In keeping with the gift-exchange economy of pre-Revolutionary food diplomacy and the 
strand of British thought that feared hungry Indians, British officials continued to provide food 
because they assumed Indians needed it, but they also purchased provisions from Indians to 
cultivate alliances. In January 1778, 2,700 Native women and children came to Detroit, where 
they ate “all the Beef . . . in six or seven days.”125 In one lieutenant’s return of provisions issued 
at Niagara, he voiced his astonishment “at the number of rations issued to the Indians.” Out of a 
total of 75,200, Indians and Rangers received the most, or 57,341 rations; the King’s (or 8th) 
Regiment was a distant second at 10,746.126 Some of the beef came from the Indians; the same 
lieutenant had felt “obliged to buy up all the cattle the Indians had to spare,” to “keep the 
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Savages in good Temper.”127 His use of the word “obliged” likely indicated that he purchased 
cattle from Indians to broker good relations by overpaying and overfeeding them. Later he 
reflected that had he refused, the Indians might have become “offended,” and “cou’d have joined 
the Rebels.”128  
Americans, meanwhile, made less nuanced overtures by describing their relationship with 
the British in terms of forest diplomacy, and asking the Iroquois to remain neutral. When colony 
representatives met the Iroquois in 1775 they explained that the British were “slip[ping] their 
hand into our pocket without asking,” taking “our charters or written civil constitutions . . . our 
plantations, our houses and goods,” as well as restricting American trade. In addition to listing 
complaints about taxation and restrictive acts, they described their relationship with the British as 
a disintegrating common dish: “If our people labour in the fields, they will not know who shall 
enjoy the crop. If they hunt in the Woods, it will be uncertain who shall taste the meat.” Britons 
refused to share, and colonists, they concluded, “cannot be sure whether they shall be permitted 
to eat drink and wear the fruits of their own labour.” The “old covenant chain which united our 
fathers and theirs” was rusted. Americans attempted to invoke Iroquois sympathy by portraying 
themselves as Indians did to the British. Although they had not yet declared independence, they 
nevertheless felt “necessitated to rise, and forced to fight.” They asked the Indians to maintain 
neutrality and “not join on either side.”129 Later Indian speeches around 1776 indicate that these 
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efforts remained subsidiary to Indian complaints about Americans’ inadequate trade 
diplomacy.130 Without sufficient financial backing, trade, or food goods, American diplomacy 
was less persuasive.131  
By January 1776 the Americans distributed actual foodstuffs, and by August General 
Philip Schuyler noted the “incredible” costs of the rum and provisions.132 One American Indian 
commissioner recorded providing Mohawks with victuals enough for 30 people, “11 Cayugoes 
and 1 Onnondaga” with three meals each, and 120 unnamed Indians with 36 pounds of bacon, “2 
Fat Swine,” and “70 Loaves of Bread.” These allocations are difficult to interpret because they 
appear in an accounts list, without additional commentary. By March 1778, 300 to 400 Iroquois 
warriors joined the Continental service, and Albany commissioners resolved “to furnish” them 
with “provisions from Time to Time.”133 Contemporary provisions lists indicate that Indians 
received rum, beef, and bread after returning from Washington’s camp.134 This decision, like 
Britons’ decision to provision Iroquois women and children, was likely a symbolic gesture rather 
than a full supply of food on which Indians depended.  
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The Iroquois maintained neutrality, requested edible goods, and supplied British and 
American troops with provisions. American-allied Iroquois provided food to British-allied 
Iroquois, despite American protests—suggesting the continuing importance of Gayaneshagowa 
and nonaggression. At a 1778 meeting American-allied Oneidas told Americans that although “It 
is probable that there are some . . . who are inimical to us and who would wish to give 
Information” to British Major John Butler, they would “cause them to be supplied with 
provisions” and rum for “the Journey to Niagara.”135 Six Nations also appealed to officials who 
believed that they needed to purchase Indians’ allegiance as part of a commodity-exchange 
economy by accepting food as payment, and reciprocating payments with their own distributions 
of provisions. In September 1778, a group of British-allied Onondagas desired “provision to 
carry on the Service.” Onondagas wanted food and ammunition sent to Lake Ontario because it 
was “nearest to the Seneca & 6 Nations Country.”136 They stated their willingness to fight, and 
then asked for the sustenance to do so.  
Although Iroquois women’s control of provisions had decreased before the Revolution 
(in part because of William Johnson’s efforts to become the main distributor), they remained key 
suppliers.137 American-allied Oneida villages were well-stocked enough in 1777 that those 
Indians provisioned American soldiers at Valley Forge, and could likely continue to provide for 
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their own warriors.138 Iroquois oral histories today tell the story of Oneida Polly Cooper, who 
went with other Iroquois to feed the Continental Army at Valley Forge in 1777-78. Cooper 
supposedly showed the Americans how to prepare corn for soup, and eventually received a 
bonnet, hat, and shawl from Martha Washington as thanks.139 
At other times, Indians made it difficult for non-Natives to obtain food from them. One 
man’s journal lamented that while on the march with 300 Senecas and Delawares, he “many a 
time had very hungry times.” He complained about having to pay “a hard dollar for 4 small 
Indian cakes, and sometimes could not get it at all.” Repeatedly, he went “into a wigwam and 
waited for a Hommany Kettle with the greatest impatience to get a trifle and was often 
disappointed.”140 Though Americans and Britons provided food to Indians, Indians did not 
always reciprocate. Sometimes Natives charged what the British considered high prices for their 
food. In the case of the kettle it appears that there was hominy, given that the white soldier 
waited for it, so it is curious that the food was not divided evenly. Perhaps this incident was 
exceptional, or perhaps Native women considered it strange that soldiers did not receive 
provisions from their own wives.  
One other aspect of food-related events before 1779 is unusual. Heretofore Iroquois 
Indians avoided attacking indigenous food stores.141 During the Revolution the British 
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encouraged Native allies to pilfer cattle, horses, and grain from American farms and supply 
wagons.142 In 1777, however, New Yorkers and Oneida Indians attacked Mohawk crops at 
Canajoharie, marking a departure from Iroquois nonaggression.143 As historians have suggested, 
this moment was exceptional.144 Even in this instance Oneidas waited until Mohawks left 
Canajoharie; they attacked crops but not people.  
The use of food to wage war and form alliances set significant precedents by 1779. Until 
that time British food diplomacy involved giving Indians symbolic food gifts that did not 
comprise the majority of their diets—even when offered frequently to reaffirm fidelity. Indians 
used food to talk to each other: British-allied Iroquois, by providing it to Indians allied with the 
revolutionary forces, and American-allied Iroquois by breaking nonaggression agreements and 
attacking the crops and animals of Britain's Iroquois allies. Indians had proved capable of 
controlling supply, demanding food when they felt justified, and stealing it, when necessary. 
More important was that by 1779 everyone knew that the destruction of crops and thefts of 
domesticated animals caused chaos. 
*** 
 In 1779 Americans invaded Iroquoia, ushering in crop and animal scarcities, Indian 
hunger, and an unexpected change in food diplomacy. British officials responded by sending aid 
into individual villages and hosting Indians at forts, as they had previously. In contrast to earlier 
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decades military leaders increased the rations they provided to warriors in response to Indian 
demands, but at the same time Indians professed themselves uninterested in addressing their 
hunger. Indians also curtailed their allies’ access to food. These changes underscore the need to 
question non-Native portrayals of Indian hunger, dependency, and powerlessness during and 
after the American Revolution.  
Britons described Indians as food insecure even before the attack. John Butler observed 
that opportunities to raid for cattle had decreased while Indian consumption of their own cattle 
had increased. To add to these issues, the Indians had not planted “the usual quantity” of “corn, 
pulse, and things of that kind” because a combination of military service and colonial attacks had 
depleted their crops.145 Scattered settlement patterns yielded large quantities of stored corn, but 
an American attack could still prove problematic because of the challenge of transporting corn to 
those who needed it. The combination of depleted corn and cattle set the stage for the summer 
campaign.  
The 1779 expedition was a systematic campaign of devastation against British-allied 
Iroquois. Its “immediate objects,” wrote George Washington, were “the total destruction” of Six 
Nations’ villages.146 In April Colonel Goose Van Schaick began the intrusion, striking the main 
Onondaga village, killing a dozen people and taking another 33 noncombatants prisoner—whom 
American soldiers may have raped and killed.147 During the summer, three armies led by Major 
General John Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton, and Colonel Daniel Brodhead raced 
                                                 
145
 John Butler to Frederick Haldimand, Canadasango, July 21, 1779, ff. 115-16, Add. MS 21765, BL. 
146
 [George Washington] to John Sullivan, Head Quarters, Middle Brook, May 31, 1779, HM 1590, the Huntington 
Library.  
147
 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 98. 
36 
across New York.148 They spent the summer attacking Seneca and Cayuga towns. Sullivan 
destroyed at least seventeen Seneca settlements between Chemung and Genesee Castle, and 
Brodhead’s men razed eleven settlements on the Allegheny River.149  
Americans set the “very fine and extensive” cornfields of Iroquoia on fire.150 Soldiers 
wrote letters and diary entries about making “large fires with parts of houses and other woods,” 
and “piling the corn on,” to ensure total destruction. On August 13 at Chemung they lit “a 
glorious bonfire of upwards of 30 buildings at once” to burn “about 40 acres” of fields. In 
another town “called Kanegsae or Yucksea” they burned corn for four hours. The next day they 
spent eight hours burning 20,000 bushels at the Genesee Flats.151 At Oswego they “destroyed all 
their crops,” and near Canadasago they “girdled the fruit trees and destroyed the corn.”152 
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Finally, after burning “the Genesee Village,” the Americans retreated.153 By September the 
expedition had achieved Washington’s aim of exiling Indians and throwing them “wholly on the 
British Enemy.”154  
Sullivan claimed his men destroyed at least 160,000 bushels of corn, other vegetables, 
and animals.155 Soldiers did not distinguish between reports of stored and standing corn, so the 
campaign possibly destroyed even more than Sullivan estimated.156 Historians know that each 
Indian ate approximately six bushels of corn per year.157 Even if one takes the lower prewar 
population estimate of 6,400 people, the Iroquois required 38,400 bushels of corn per year—and 
Sullivan may have destroyed four times that quantity. John Butler sent word that “all the Indians 
with their Families are moving in [to Niagara], as their Villages & Corn are Destroyed.”158 More 
than 5,000 Iroquois Indians arrived at Niagara alone, alongside Delawares, Chugnuts, Oquagas, 
Shawnees, Oswegos, Nanticokes, Toderighoes, and Mahicans; hundreds died of disease.159  
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British defense of Indian towns was lackluster during the 1779 expedition, and during the 
fall they questioned their relationship with the Iroquois at an inopportune moment. During the 
campaign, General Frederick Haldimand, Governor of Quebec, worried about the costs of 
feeding Indians, began to voice his desire to cut provisions.160 The “quantity consumed by the 
Savages is enormous,” he complained.161 He asked John Butler to remind the Indians “that all 
our distress . . . proceeds from the amazing quantity of provisions they consume” at the same 
time that he refused to supply Butler with rations.162 In the fall of 1780 Haldimand, seeking to 
avoid a repeat of the 1779 winter, sought to decrease the number of Indians he would need to 
feed. “The number of Indians victualled at Niagara is prodigious, and if not by some means 
reduced, must terminate very disagreably,” he wrote. “No useless Mouth, which can possibly be 
sent away” could be allowed to “remain for the Winter.”163 In the 1760s William Johnson had 
increased provisions to Indians and had these efforts curtailed by Amherst and the British 
ministry; after 1779 Haldimand tried to decrease provisions, and failed. 
It is instructive to compare the aftermath of the 1779 campaign to other instances of 
European devastation—particularly seventeenth-century French campaigns against the Iroquois. 
Absent from the historiography is European food diplomacy. Gilles Havard says that French 
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expeditions against Senecas in 1687, Mohawks in 1693, and Onondagas and Oneidas in 1696 
destroyed food stocks and corn fields.164 The scholars who have commented on Iroquois 
recovery after Denonville’s notorious 1687 invasion have focused on intra-Iroquois behavior 
rather than interactions between Native and non-Natives. Jon Parmenter notes that although 
French-allied Iroquois could not prevent the destruction of English-allied Iroquois corn in 1696, 
they sheltered English-allied Iroquois refugees.165 Little evidence exists of Indians engaging in 
crop destruction, or moving to European forts. Brandão’s extensive research does not discuss 
provisions during or after the campaign. W. J. Eccles described Frenchmen provisioning 
themselves by portaging supplies, feeding French-allied Indians a feast of dogs, and luring a 
party of neutral Iroquois into Fort Frontenac Champigny with promises of a feast.166 Havard 
states the Iroquois critiqued English inabilities to provide troops, military action, arms, and 
ammunition.167 New York supplied the Iroquois with some arms, enough to enable them to carry 
out revenge raids that forced the French to abandon Forts Niagara and Frontenac.168 But food 
rations are not mentioned. During later, eighteenth-century instances of famine—as in the 
1740s—Senecas dealt with hunger by resettling closer to Cayugas.169 During earlier instances, as 
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in seventeenth-century Virginia, Powhatans gave surplus food to starving Englishman, rather 
than the other way around.170 
Previous examples of Indian hunger, particularly the Denonville expedition, suggest that 
the 1779 campaign’s effects were different for three reasons: first, because of the increase in 
British provisions to Indian warriors, in addition to noncombatants’ provisions during previous 
decades; second, because the British officials who tried to curtail Indian hunger failed; and third, 
because Indian attitudes toward hunger appeared to change. To be sure, continuity existed. 
Natives reminded Britons of the one pot metaphor and that allies needed to share hunger as well 
as provisions, and they accepted food without reciprocating with military service. By September 
1779 one official related that John Butler had encountered “difficulties” obtaining food and thus 
in “assembling the Indians.”171 Indians accused the British of hoarding extra food at Quebec, but 
even when the British supplied 200 warriors with “every thing they wanted in Clothing, 
Provisions &c.” they could “only prevail on 44 to set off.”172 Haldimand was shocked to find that 
some married couples had received provisions twice—once, as Indians belonging to the Seven 
Nations of Canada, and again, as Iroquois Indians.173 Indians continued to eat in ways that 
deviated from British expectations—but British perceptions also changed. Whereas in previous 
years Britons assumed that they would feed Iroquois women and children symbolic gifts while 
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men hunted game and women grew crops and managed war provisions, during and after the 
winter of 1779-80 the British expected to feed nearly all Indians. In February 1781, Indians 
around Niagara would arrive “upon us sooner than could be wished” because of their lack of 
success “on their hunting grounds” and “the severity of the last winter.”174 Natives now arrived 
at military forts in time for winter, and Britons planned to host them for the duration of the 
season.  
At the same time that Britons drastically increased provisions to Indians, the Iroquois 
worked to eradicate the British perception of Indians as useless mouths. Because food diplomacy 
had become more important, the Iroquois made an impression by implying that they cared less 
about eating than their English allies. They critiqued British appetites, expressed annoyance that 
the British “talked of nothing but Provisions,” and implied that hungry warriors remained 
capable of fighting.175 Officials’ attempts to remove Indians from their forts to save money 
prompted Indians’ declarations that they could withstand starvation. In October 1779 Guy 
Johnson and John Butler tried to convince the Iroquois to leave Fort Niagara because they 
anticipated trouble shipping provisions there.176 In November Guy Johnson finally “prevailed 
on” several hundred Indians to depart.177 Those remaining stated their lack of interest in 
provisioning problems. The Cayuga Twethorechte told British officials, “We of the Six Nations 
have been much cast down by the great Loss we have sustained in the Destruction of several of 
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our Villages and Corn-Fields.” He appreciated “what has been said on the Score of Provisions,” 
but said that the Indians “cannot think of separating.” If the Indians had “to suffer for Provisions 
we cannot help it.” They felt “determined to persevere in the Cause,” and would “endeavour in 
some Measure to help [them]selves by Hunting.”178 Crucially, the Iroquois stopped exaggerating 
their hunger and poverty and made it impossible for the British to feed them at the precise 
moment when starvation became a reality. Twethorechte’s words indicated that Indians may 
have been motivated by concerns other than food. Sharing a common dish had always meant 
going hungry when the dish was empty, but examples from the 1610s, 1680s, 1690s, and 1740s 
suggest that Indians handled starvation better than non-Natives.  
The idea of unintended consequences becomes useful here. An unintended consequence 
is the “effect of purposive social action which is different from what was wanted at the moment 
of carrying out the act, and the want of which was a reason for carrying it out.”179 Haldimand 
wanted to cut costs, so he tried to curtail Indian eating; the unintended consequences consisted of 
altered British perceptions of Indian hunger and a change in Indian diplomacy that increased 
British provisioning to Indians. Presumably, Indians wanted to remain gathered together in one 
group to maintain community ties. It is unclear whether the Iroquois ever described their 
intentions, but changes in British practices suggests that British perceptions of Indian hunger had 
conformed to the idea of self-sufficient, non-hungry Indians who nevertheless required food for 
diplomatic purposes. An additional unintended consequence becomes apparent in Indians’ 
obliteration of British food supplies. 
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By 1781, Indians were destroying allies’ foodstuffs. In August a party of Indians and 
rangers met at Oswego, where the Senecas “held a council . . . without advising” the British of 
their plans. They informed British officers they would go to Monbackers (in present-day 
Rochester) and “to no other place” because they were “in a starving condition,” and it was “a 
verry rich country.” One officer remembered feeling compelled to go with them, “altho contrary 
to my Instructions.” The Indians were skittish because the region was “an advantageous place to 
the Enemy,” and they wanted to avoid another Continental attack. For a time the Indians helped 
the British destroy mills, “thirty large storehouses,” grain, and animals, but as the expedition 
progressed the Iroquois began ruining food supplies. At an American-defended fort, the Indians 
burned the men with the “large quantities of grain” inside it, rather than giving quarter to the 
troops. The officer, hoping to save face, reported that he suggested the destruction of grain 
houses because he did not have enough men to take the forts. In reality he lost control of the 
situation. He related that “the Indians were So glutted with plunder &c. that few of them would 
proceed with me.” Those who stayed helped drive off cattle, but they also procured several 
wounds—which meant that temporarily well-fed Indians did not feel safe returning with the 
British. The officers were horrified “to see the Indians kill and take the greatest part of the cattle 
that were captured by the Rangers,” leaving the rank and file in “a starving situation.”180 The 
men in charge could not stop them.  
Over time this conduct manifested among non-Iroquois Indians. In June 1780 a group of 
Shawnees and Great Lakes Indians arrived at the American-held Fort Liberty with Britons Henry 
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Bird and Alexander McKee.181 Although the Indians agreed to let the British take “the Cattle for 
Food for our People, and the Prisoners,” the Indians instead killed civilians, and “every one of 
the Cattle, leaving the whole to stink.” Again at the next fort, “not one pound of Meat” 
survived.182 Although historians have described food scarcities in the wake of the 1779 
campaign, Indians in the archival record destroyed domesticated animals, even though the 
Johnson papers suggest that by this time they had been eating beef for years. It is impossible to 
say what Natives were thinking during these moments, but it is evident that British attitudes 
toward Indians changed.  
By the 1780s Britons made efforts to increase food distribution. Each month the 
superintendent of Indian affairs assessed how much food villages required by sending men to 
obtain a headcount; Indians then received tickets from the commissary, which they could redeem 
for provisions.183 Haldimand’s correspondence reveals a summary of Indian preferences: corn 
was best, then bread, and finally flour.184 Natives’ wishes for fresh or salted provisions altered 
depending on the season. They sometimes complained that salty food threatened their health.185 
By 1780, Indians around Montreal were requesting five days of fresh provisions out of each 
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week—more than twice what they received in previous years. Haldimand granted their request 
less than a week later, indicating the extent of British accommodation.186 British expenditures on 
supplies to Fort Niagara alone increased from £500 New York currency at the start of the war to 
£100,000 in 1781.187  
*** 
During the colonial era, food diplomacy was bound up in the forest and trade diplomacy 
that Americans, Britons, and Indians used to maintain allegiances. Britons offered Indians edible 
goods before, during, and after meetings and treaties, and supplied aid to villages, while Native 
Americans supported each other. In the 1760s, colonial diplomacy transformed. Trade good 
scarcities, land problems, and shipping issues made trade and forest diplomacy less tenable. 
During the early years of the American Revolution, little about food diplomacy changed. After 
Americans’ devastating expedition of 1779, the Iroquois altered their food diplomacy to 
challenge perceptions of Indian hunger and to ruin Britons’ food. Britons in turn went out of the 
way to accommodate Indian preferences. The idea of the “useless mouth” thus takes on two 
meanings: that of non-contributing, hungry Indians, and the meaning, implied by this article, of 
hungry Indians who ignored their hunger and destroyed food to strengthen alliances.  
Scholars have portrayed postwar Indian country as a place of simultaneous resilience and 
desolation.188 Food diplomacy confirms this resiliency, but also makes clear that in addition to 
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assessing affairs by looking at land cessions, historians should consider exchanges of foodstuffs 
produced on that land. They should also reassess claims about what hunger forced Indians to do. 
According to Alan Taylor, Iroquois communities hard-hit by food shortages accommodated U.S. 
officials because they needed food aid.189 William Fenton observed that Americans after the 
Revolution tried “to eliminate or cut down” the expenses of treaty councils, including the 
feasting involved.190 Yet U.S. Indian commissioners in the 1790s practiced generous food 
diplomacy according to Indian standards, rather than American ones. 
U.S. Indian commissioner and future Secretary of War Timothy Pickering began his 
education in Indian affairs at a 1790 meeting to condole over the murder of two Seneca men.191 
As part of his initiation into Indian diplomacy, Pickering “studied to please them in every thing,” 
condoling with, speaking to, gifting, and provisioning 220 people.192 In 1791, when Pickering 
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prepared to meet the Iroquois on the Tioga River, Indians asked him to supply them with alcohol 
and provisions beforehand. In what he thought was a compromise Pickering responded that he 
could send provisions only part of the way. Upon arrival, an Oneida named Good Peter chided 
him, supposing, “that the business of holding treaties with Indians was novel to me.” Good Peter 
complained that the Indians had been “obliged to ask for provisions” while traveling, and a 
chastised Pickering reimbursed them.193  
Indians were not useless mouths; they portrayed their hunger strategically and took steps 
to avoid it. Conflicting non-Native perceptions of Iroquois hunger underscore the point that 
hunger is not universal. Iroquoian food diplomacy suggests hunger was less relevant to Indians 
than non-Natives thought, and on a broader level should encourage historians working in other 
time periods to examine hunger more critically. Extant work has started to undertake this project. 
Twentieth-century United States food aid after PL 480 functioned on the assumption that 
Americans produced a surplus.194 Colonial nationalists in Ireland and India resisted colonizers by 
portraying hunger as a symbol of British failures.195 The twentieth century Mexican bureaucracy 
was able to ensure food security by encouraging the development of agribusinesses, which 
destroyed small farming and spurred migration to cities.196 Subaltern critics in India challenged 
the implementation of calorie-counting to evaluate diet by elevating rice and lentils over wheat 
and meat, and urging others to eschew imperial coffee, sugar, and tea.197 Understandings of food 
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and its absence are different across time and space, and historians cannot assume that hunger is 
equivalent to powerlessness; if scholars are used to thinking about Americans as an increasingly 
powerful group and Natives as an increasingly powerless one, then hunger sheds light on 
moments when uncertainty about power remained the only constant. 
